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This study examines the relationship between academic achievement and strategic ability to coordinate among middle school students. We designed an experimental framework using repeated asymmetric Battle of the Sexes and Hawk–Dove games, to explore how cognitive and social skills related to academic success influence behavior. A total of 132 students participated, divided into groups of high and low academic achievers based on their performance at school. Our results show that, on average, high achievers coordinate better on equilibrium outcomes with simple but effective strategies and obtain higher payoffs compared to low achievers. However, we notice also substantial heterogeneity within groups. Finally, performance in pairs with one high and one low achiever is intermediate but closer to the level of high achievers, suggesting potential peer learning effects and the educational value of mixed groups to promote guidance and joint improvements. These findings suggest that academic success may reflect broader cognitive abilities–such as strategic thinking, anticipation of others’ choices, and cooperation–crucial for navigating real-world interactions in complex environments. 

We study the foundations for the development of optimal randomization in mixed strategy games. We consider a population of children and adolescents (7 to 16 years old) and study in the laboratory their behavior in a nonzero sum, hide‐and‐seek game with a unique interior mixed strategy equilibrium where each location has a known but different value. The vast majority of participants favor the high‐value location not only as seekers (as predicted by theory) but also as hiders (in contradiction with theory). The behavior is extremely similar across all ages, and also similar to that of the college students control adult group. We also study the use of cheap talk (potentially deceptive) messages in this game. Hiders are excessively truthful in the messages they send while seekers have a slight tendency to (correctly) believe hiders. In general, however, messages have a small impact on outcomes. The results point to a powerful (erroneous) heuristic thinking in two‐person randomization settings that does not get corrected, even partially, with age.